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ANTITRUST LAW IN COLORADO: BACK ON TRACK
INTRODUCTION
To many lay persons, the term "antitrust" conjures up thoughts of huge
corporations and elite corporate lawyers. To many lawyers, antitrust re-
mains a distant and esoteric area of the law.I While both of these viewpoints
are justified to a certain extent, they are also restrictively narrow, for anti-
trust law is indeed a broader and more pervasive subject. Most businessmen
will, at some time, encounter an antitrust problem.2 In fact, most of the
people who violate the antitrust laws are small businessmen or local field
executives of larger corporations. 3 The subject case, People v. North Avenue
Furniture and Appliance, Inc. ,4 exemplifies this wider notion of antitrust law.
North Avenue is a price-fixing case involving small businessmen in Grand
Junction, Colorado. The decision appears destined to assume an important
bench-mark status in Colorado's antitrust law for three reasons. First, North
Avenue is the Colorado Supreme Court's initial construction of the state's
modern antitrust statute.5 Second, state antitrust enforcement has increased
dramatically in recent years, both in Colorado and across the nation.6 North
Avenue, as the sole source of state judicial precedent, will naturally be a guid-
ing force for this increased antitrust activity in Colorado. Finally, although
the holding in North Avenue is necessarily narrow, the reasoning employed to
reach that holding appears to be broadly applicable to future cases constru-
ing Colorado's antitrust statute.
This comment begins with a historical overview of Colorado's scant and
unsettled7 antitrust law. This background helps prepare for a discussion of
the North Avenue decision and an analysis of its major issues. The comment
concludes by outlining some of the possible ramifications of this important
case.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW IN COLORADO
Colorado originally recognized a cause of action under the common law
doctrine of "restraint of trade."8 The legislature enacted this doctrine into
the first antitrust statute in 1913.9 After some brisk application in the early
1. Ducker, Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer, 44 DEN. L.J. 558, 558 (1967).
2. Id.
3. Prce Firing. Crackdown Underway, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 34, Col. 1.
4. 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1982).
5. Id. at 1294. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -108 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
6. Burke & Walters, Antitrust Enforcement in Colorado: New Directions, New Concerns, 6 COLO.
LAW. 1, 1 (1977). See generally Rah1, State Antitrust Symposium, 4 J. CORP. L. 475 (1979).
7. Note, Colorado Antitrust Law Untiedand i)rifing, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 215, 215, 231
(1977).
8. See Denver Jobbers Ass'n v. People ex ret. Dickson, 21 Colo. App. 326, 122 P. 404
(1912). For general background information on Colorado antitrust law, see generally North Ave-
nue, 645 P.2d at 1294; Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 6-7; Ducker, supra note 1, at 560-62;
Note, supra note 7, at 215.
9. 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 161, § 1.
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1920's,t ° the statute was declared unconstitutionally vague by the United
States Supreme Court in 1927.11 This ruling resulted in a thirty-year hiatus
in the state's antitrust law, 12 which lasted until the present statute's enact-
ment in 1957.13
When drafting the state's modern antitrust statute, 1 4 the Colorado legis-
lature used Wisconsin's antitrust statute 15 as a prototype. Wisconsin had
based its statute on applicable sections of the federal antitrust statutes,
16
namely the Sherman Act of 189017 and the Clayton Act of 1914.18
Although case law construing the federal antitrust statutes abounds,' 9
the modern Colorado antitrust statute did not receive a substantive judicial
interpretation until 1975, eighteen years after its enactment. 20 This inter-
pretation came from a federal court in the case of Q-TMarkets, Inc. v. Fleming
Companzes, Inc. 21 Although Q-T Markets did not address the same antitrust
issues as North Avenue, 22 the method of analysis employed by the Q-TMarkets
court became extremely significant in deciding North Avenue and, therefore
merits a brief discussion.
10. Se People v. Apostolos, 73 Colo. 71, 213 P. 331 (1923) (1913 antitrust statute applied
to shoe industry); Johnson v. People, 72 Colo. 218, 210 P. 843 (1922) (statute applied to price
fixing in electrical contracting business); Campbell v. People, 72 Colo. 213, 210 P. 841 (1922)
(statute applied to restraint of plumbing and gas fitting business).
11. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
12. Note, supra note 7, at 215.
13. Colorado Antitrust Act, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 369 (originally codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 55-4-1 to -9 (1958)). The antitrust statute is currently codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -108 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Restraint of Trade and Commerce). Colo-
rado has promulgated other statutes designed to prevent anti-competitive practices: COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-101 to -114 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Consumer Protection Act) and COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -117 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (Unfair Practices Act). Two other provi-
sions were repealed in 1975: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -106 (1973) (Fair Trade Act) and
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-5-101 to -114 (1973) (Unfair Cigarette Sales Act).
14. The North Aoenue court cited the affidavit of David J. Clark, the drafter of the antitrust
bill, which states in pertinent part:
I decided that the antitrust statute enacted in Wisconsin. . . provided the best model.
I then drafted the bill which was subsequently enacted as Senate Bill No. 200 using
the Wisconsin statute as a model. . . . In drafting this legislation it was my intent to
follow the substantive provisions of the Wisconsin statute so that any court decision
interpreting the Wisconsin statute could be cited by Colorado courts.
People v. North Ave. Furniture & Appliance, Inc., 645 P.2d at 1294, n.4.
15. WIS. STAT. § 133.01 (1939) (current version at Wis. STAT. § 133.03 (1980)).
16. See Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058
(1914),cert. denited, 249 U.S. 610 (1919) (Wisconsin Supreme Court held that its antitrust statute
was to mean the same thing as the federal statute).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19. Note, supra note 7, at 225-26.
20. Id. at 215. North Avenue is the only decision by the Colorado Supreme Court construing
the state's antitrust statute, and only three cases even mentioning the Colorado antitrust statute
have ever reached the Colorado Court of Appeals. None of the three cases was decided on a
substantive application of the antitrust statute. See National Cigarette Serv. Co. v. Farr, 42
Colo. App. 356, 594 P.2d 603 (1979); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Sullivan, 534 P.2d 1226 (Colo. App.
1975) (not selected for official publication); People cx rel. Kinsey v. Sumner, 34 Colo. App. 61,
525 P.2d 512 (1974). See also Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, North Ave. Furniture & Appli-
ance, Inc., 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1982).
21. 394 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1975).
22. Q-T Markets dealt with the application of the restraint of trade provision of the Colo-
rado Antitrust Act to tying agreements and exclusive dealing contracts.
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A. The Q-T Markets Case
The plaintiff in Q-T Markets asserted both federal and state antitrust
claims against the defendant. 23 The federal claims alleged an illegal tying
arrangement, 24 in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 25 and an exclu-
sive dealing contract, 26 in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. 27 More
importantly for present purposes, the plaintiff also alleged a violation of Col-
orado's Antitrust Act.28 The federal court entertained the state claim under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,29 whereby the federal court construes
state law in accordance with available state interpretations. 30 Because no
Colorado case law construing the antitrust statute existed, the federal court
interpreted the state statute as a matter of first impression.
3'
In its interpretation of section 6-4-101,32 the federal court seized upon
slight differences 33 in language between the Colorado statute and the Sher-
man Act. The court concluded that "[b]ecause of those differences it would
be unwarranted to assume that the Colorado legislature intended to adopt
the case law interpreting the Federal statutes." 34 The court therefore strictly
construed the Colorado statute in accordance with the literal meaning of
the language used by the legislature. 35 The court's holding has had an
ironic result: while Colorado's Little Sherman Act was drafted so as to track
the federal Sherman Act,36 the effect of Q-TMarkets was to disregard the
entire body of federal case law construing the Sherman Act. The Q-TMar-
kets decision made Colorado a minority of one3 7 by construing its antitrust
law independently of federal law. Courts and commentators have, without
exception, questioned or criticized this holding, arguing instead that federal
precedent should furnish a guide to interpreting Colorado's antitrust stat-
23. 394 F. Supp. at 1105.
24. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) where an illegal
tying arrangement was defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier."
25. 394 F. Supp. at 1107.
26. See 3 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 11.03 (1982),
defining an exclusive dealing contract as one where "the buyer is precluded from purchasing a
particular commodity from anyone but the seller; in other words, the sales are conditioned on
the agreement that no competing lines will be carried."
27. 394 F. Supp. at 1109.
28. Id. at 1105.
29. See Chatanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). See also Ro-
mero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
30. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
31. 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
32. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
33. The court found the significant difference between the two statutes to be that section 1
of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 and Supp. V 1981) (emphasis
added). The Colorado statute omits the words "or otherwise." 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
34. 394 F. Supp. at 1106.
35. Id.
36. 645 P.2d at 1294.
37. But cf. Note, State Anti-Merger Policy: Divesting the Federal Government of Exclusive Regula-
tion, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 531, 564 n.189 (1981) (speculating that Louisiana may also construe
its antitrust statute independently of federal precedent).
1983]
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ute.38 Q-T Markets, however, remained the only reported construction of the
statute until 1982 when People v. North Avenue Furniture and Apphance, Inc., pro-
vided an opportunity to challenge the Q-T Markets decision.
II. PEOPLE V. NORTH A VENUE FURNITURE
A. Facts
Adam Smith once said that "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices."
'39
While that statement may be somewhat conclusory, it nonetheless applies to
the circumstances of People v. North Avenue Furniture.
In Grand Junction, Colorado, the locus of the instant controversy, the
larger retail carpet stores subcontract their installation work to independent
carpet installers. As part of the total purchase price, retailers quote carpet
installation rates to their customers from a published price list. 40 In early
1980, the defendants, who were all either sellers or installers of carpeting,
met to discuss the possibility of increasing the established price for carpet
installation. The defendants reached an initial agreement on a fixed price
increase for installation services.4 1 The increase was then proposed for ap-
proval to twenty-five other independent carpet installers in the area, who
later became unindicted co-conspirators. 4 2 This group also approved the in-
crease, and the installers and retailers agreed to abide by the newly estab-
lished prices effective March 1, 1980.
The Attorney General's office received an anonymous complaint re-
garding the price-fixing arrangement and initiated a grand jury investiga-
tion. 43 This resulted in the return of an indictment charging price-fixing
violations under the Colorado Antitrust Act in May of 1980.
4 4
The district court dismissed the indictments in November of 1980 after
finding the defendant's activity was protected by the statutory labor exemp-
tion to the antitrust statute.4 5 Disagreeing with the lower court's construc-
tion of the labor exemption, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal to
38. North Avenue, 645 P.2d at 1293, n.3 ("We therefore reject the contrary assumption im-
plicit in Q-TMarkets.'); Kelly v. Blue Cross, 1979-1 Trade Cases (CCH), 62,646 at 77,651
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1979) ("The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's [citation of the Q-TMarkets
case]."); Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 7 ("Whether or not the Colorado courts will follow
this . . . [Q-T Markets] analysis remains to be seen. Some hint of rejection can be found
.... .); Note, supra note 7, at 229-30 ("The Q-TMarkets opinion abrogates the pervasive intent
of state legislatures to look to federal law and landmark cases in construing their own laws.").
39. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (1st Modern Library ed. 1937), quoted by
Ducker, supra note 1, at 577.
40. 645 P.2d at 1292.
41. Id.
42. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, People v. North Ave. Furniture, 645 P.2d 1291 (Colo.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Opening Brief].
43. 645 P.2d at 1293.
44. Id.
45. Id. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-4-103(2) (1973), which states that "[t]he labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."
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the Colorado Supreme Court.
4 6
B. The Issues and Decisions
In North Avenue the Colorado Supreme Court confronted the state anti-
trust statute on first impression. 47 The principal issue of the case concerned
the construction of the statutory labor exemption.48 Before considering
whether the case qualified for the exemption, however, the court had to de-
cide whether Colorado's antitrust statute even applied to North Avenue.
49
1. The "Trade or Commerce" Issue
The illegal restraint of trade provision of the Colorado Antitrust Act
provides in part that "[e]very contract or combination in the nature of a
trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared illegal . . . 50
The preliminary issue, then, was whether carpet installation, generally con-
sidered a service, was also "trade or commerce" within the scope of the anti-
trust statute.5 1 If carpet installation was not a trade under the purview of
section 6-4-101, then the antitrust statute would not apply, and construction
of the labor exemption issue would have been unnecessary.
2. The Decision
The court held that carpet installation was "trade or commerce" within
the meaning of the Colorado Antitrust Act. 52 The court noted that the dis-
tinction between carpet installation as an exchange of services for money, as
opposed to an exchange of commodities for money, was without antitrust
significance.
53
In reaching their conclusion, the Colorado court chose to follow the
multitude of federal cases that broadly apply the Sherman Act. 54 The court
46. The notice of appeal to the supreme court from the district court was filed pursuant to
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102 (1973 & Supp. 1982) and COLO. App. R. 4(b).
47. 645 P.2d at 1294.
48. Id. at 1297.
49. Id. at 1296.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). This section pro-
vides in full that:
Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce is declared illegal. Every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool,
agreement, or contract intended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or
price of any article or commodity constituting a subject of trade or commerce in this
state, or every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract which con-
trols in any manner the price of any such article or commodity, fixes the price thereof,
or limits or fixes the amount or quantity thereof to be manufactured, produced, or sold
in this state, or monopolizes or attempts to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce in this state, is declared an illegal restraint of trade.
Id. The penalties for violating the Colorado antitrust statute are found in COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-4-107 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
51. 645 P.2d at 1296.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For other examples of labor and service industries within the scope of the Sherman Act,
see, e.g. , National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (engineering
services); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (stock brokerage services);
Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
1983]
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was persuaded by legislative history which showed that in enacting section 1
of the Sherman Act, 55 "Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could." 56
Recognizing that Colorado's section 6-4-101 was modeled on section 1 of the
Sherman Act,57 the court looked to several United States Supreme Court
constructions of the Sherman Act for guidance in construing the Colorado
Act.58
The court first looked to the Supreme Court decision in Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers v. United States," where "trade" under the Sherman Act was inter-
preted as the equivalent of "occupation, employment, or business whether
manual or mercantile." 6  Thus, laundering clothes, although a service,
nonetheless constituted a "trade" under the Sherman Act.6 1 The court also
discussed Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,6 2 where the Supreme Court held
that real estate title examination conducted by attorneys was "trade or com-
merce." 6 3 The Court tersely stated that land title examination is a service
and that exchanging such a service for money is "commerce" in the most
ordinary use of that term.64
On the strength of federal interpretations of "trade or commerce" under
the Sherman Act, the Colorado Supreme Court held carpet installation to be
within the corresponding provision of the Colorado act.6 5 This holding ap-
pears to indicate that Colorado will follow the federal lead by reading wide
coverage into Colorado's Little Sherman Act.
3. The Labor Exemption Issue
Having found that carpet installation services were "trade or com-
merce" within the scope of the antitrust act, the court turned to the pivotal
issue of the case: construction of the labor exemption.
The labor exemption states that "[tihe labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce."'66 The defendants argued that because
their agreement to increase carpet installation charges "dealt solely with the
(1975) (construction services); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (coal
mining); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (furnishing news).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
56. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
57. 645 P.2d at 1294 n.4. See supra note 14.
58. Id. at 1295.
59. 286 U.S. 427 (1931).
60. Id. at 436.
61. The court's citation to Atantic Cleaners & Dyers is problematic, however, because that
case relates only to section 3 of the Sherman Act. Section 3 deals exet uiety with people engaged
in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia, and therefore, by definition, ought to be
inapplicable to other jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
62. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
63. Id. at 787.
64. Id. Perhaps the best test used to determine Sherman Act (and Little Sherman Act)
applicability is the one articulated by Sullivan: "If there is a dollar to be made, it's trade or
commerce." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 709 (1977).
65. 645 P.2d at 1296. After finding applicability of the antitrust statute to the carpet in-
stallation business, the court swiftly moved to a construction of the labor exemption. The court,
however, never stated whether the defendants' activity actually constituted a price fixing viola-
tion; instead, it tacitly assumed the requisite illegality and proceeded to construe the exemption.
In the court's defense, it should be noted that neither party discussed price fixing in their briefs.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103 (1973).
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price of human labor," their actions were immune from antitrust prosecu-
tion under the Colorado labor exemption.6 7 The Attorney General argued
that Colorado should narrowly interpret its labor exemption and thereby
limit its application to bona fide labor union activities relating to the terms
and conditions of employment.68
4. The Decision
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the defendant's broad interpre-
tation and held that in order for the labor exemption to apply, the defend-
ants' agreement would have to arise from an employer-employee
relationship concerning wages, hours of work and other conditions of
employment.
69
In arriving at this conclusion, the court had to juggle several entangled
concepts that were not susceptible of a pigeonhole analysis. It is therefore
understandable why the court experienced difficulty in articulating their ra-
tionale. The holding itself and the reasoning used, however, appear to be
entirely proper, with the net effect being that North Avenue interprets Colo-
rado's labor exemption in harmony with both the history and the case law
constructions of the federal labor exemption. The following sections explore
the court's treatment of the labor exemption issue.
C. Analysis
1. History of the Federal Labor Exemption
A necessary dimension of the court's analysis was its discussion of the
Clayton Act labor exemption. 70 The purpose of antitrust law has been to
promote free competition and prevent restraints of trade.7 ' The goal of fed-
eral labor law, however, has been to enhance workers' rights by encouraging
voluntary economic agreements between employers and employees. 72 The
aims of labor law thus clash with those of antitrust law where employer-
employee agreements have the effect of inhibiting competition and re-
straining trade.
73
The tension between antitrust law and labor law climaxed in 1908
when the Supreme Court decided the so-called Danbury Hatters case, 7 4 where
a union-organized boycott of the plaintiffs nonunion-made hats was found
67. 645 P.2d at 1293.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1299.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
71. 645 P.2d at 1295. See 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (Comments of Senator Sherman).
See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217
U.S. 413 (1910).
72. 645 P.2d at 1295. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
See also Casey & Cozzillo, Labor-Antrust: The Problems of Connell and a Remedy that Follows Natu-
rally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 235.
73. 645 P.2d at 1295. See Casey & Cozzillo, supra note 72, at 235-36; Winter, Collective
Bargaining and Competition. The Application of Antitnest Standards to Union Actieits, 73 YALE L.J. 14,
16-17 (1963).
74. Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
19831
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to violate the Sherman Act.7 5 This decision prompted the labor unions to
seek specific statutory immunity for legitimate union activities violative of
the Sherman Act. Congress responded by passing section 6 of the Clayton
Act 76-the labor exemption. In providing this exemption, Congress sought
to accommodate the important national policies of both antitrust enforce-
ment and legitimate labor union activities.
77
2. Federal Construction of the Labor Exemption
A long line of federal cases has perpetuated the historical purpose of the
Clayton Act exemption, and these cases firmly support the North Avenue
court's interpretation of the Colorado provision. Unlike the broad applica-
bility of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts narrowly construe all anti-
trust statutory exemptions in order to effectuate the legislative intent of
promoting competition. 78 The section 6 labor exemption of the Clayton Act
is no exception to this general rule, and its scope has been severely limited by
the judiciary.
In Columbia River Packers Association, Inc. v. Hinton ,79 the Supreme Court
held that the labor exemption did not apply to agreements between in-
dependent businessmen, but rather, only to employer-employee relation-
ships.8° Similarly, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd of Elec.
Workers, 8 1 the Supreme Court held the labor exemption was available only
to legitimate unilateral union activity. 82 Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers
Union v. United States83 continued the well-defined trend by stating that the
labor exemption's purpose is to ensure that legitimate union activities are
not stifled by the antitrust laws.
84
In light of this federal precedent, the Colorado Supreme Court formu-
lated the following test for application of the labor exemption: where an
agreement "arises from lawful associational activities of employees concern-
75. Id. at 301.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
77. People v. North Ave. Furniture, 645 P.2d at 1295.
78. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979).
79. 315 U.S. 143 (1943).
80. Id. at 145-47. The Supreme Court's conclusion is particularly applicable to North
Avenue:
The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The sellers
are not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they seek to be.
On the contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent businessmen,
free from such controls as an employer might exercise. That some of the fishermen
have a small number of employees of their own, who are also members of the Union,
does not alter the situation. For the dispute here, relating solely to the sale of fish, does
not place in controversy the wages or hours or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment of these employees.
Id. at 147.
81. 325 U.S 797 (1945).
82. Id. at 808-11.
83. 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
84. Id. at 103. In H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actor's Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704
(1981), the Supreme Court found that the federal labor exemption applied only to bonafide
labor activity and not to independent contractors or entrepreneurs. See also Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cesnik v. Chrysler
Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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ing the terms or conditions of their employment," the exemption is avail-
able.85 Applying this test to the facts of North Avenue, the court found that
the defendant carpet retailers and installers bore no employment relation-
ship with each other. The primary purpose of their agreement was to fix the
prices for carpet installation and thereby restrain competition in the Grand
Junction market. 86 The court therefore ruled that the labor exemption was
not available to the North Avenue defendants. 87 The court concluded by stat-
ing that businessmen cannot organize into a union and, on that basis, hope
to escape from antitrust prosecution. 88
3. Disposing of Q-T Markets
If federal law controlled the North Avenue case, the analysis would end
here. Even the defendants agreed that underfederal law, their pricing agree-
ment did not result from a union activity, much less stem from a bona fide
employer-employee relationship.8 9 Federal law, however, did not control
the instant case,90 and the issue thus became, to what extent should the fed-
eral constructions apply to the Colorado statute?
Relying on the rationale of Q- T Markets,g' defendants contended that
minor differences between the labor exemptions in the Colorado antitrust
statute and the Clayton Act indicated a legislative intent to depart from
federal precedent. 92 This argument was not frivolous as it was founded on
the logic of the only prior case which construed Colorado's modern antitrust
85. 645 P.2d at 1299.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at n.9.
89. Id. at 1297.
90. d. at 1295-96.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 23-38.
92. Since their interpretations are critical to the outcome of the case, the two statutes are
juxtaposed below. The italicized portions show the Colorado statute places the human labor
sentence in a second section, at the end of the statute. The federal provision on the other hand,
has only one section, with the human labor sentence appearing at the beginning.
In defense of the alleged price fixing, the defendants invoked Colorado's labor exemption,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103 (1973):
(1) Nothing in this article shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual
help, or engaged in making collective sales or marketing for its members or sharehold-
ers of farm, orchard, or dairy products produced by its members or shareholders, and
not having capital stock or conducted for profit or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under this article.
(2) The labor of a hunan being is not a commodiy or article of commerce.
(emphasis added).
The People offered, by way of comparison, the Clayton Act labor exemption, which served
as the model for section 6-4-103:
The labor of a hunan being is not a commodity or artitle of commerce. Nothing contained
in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help,
and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.





The court, however, viewed any reliance on Q- TMarkets as tenuous and
declined the invitation to deviate from the clear federal case law of Columbia
River Packers and its progeny. 94 The court rejected the assumption implicit
in Q-T Markets that the Colorado antitrust statute was intended to mean
something distinct from federal antitrust statutes.9 5  Instead, the court
reached the conclusion that the federal constructions were entitled to consid-
erable weight.
96
4. Justification for Applying Federal Precedent to the State Statute
Having dispensed with the Q-T Markets cases, the North Avenue court
then had to justify why it could apply federal precedent, by analogy, to the
state statute. The court accomplished this by resorting to the doctrine of in
pan materia.
Under this doctrine of statutory construction, the court interprets the
meaning of a statute by looking to constructions of statutes with similar lan-
guage and purpose.9 7 In this case, the court noted that both federal and
state antitrust laws were devoted to the dual purpose of protecting the public
against restraints of trade while preserving the rights of workers to bargain
collectively with employers over the terms and conditions of employment. 9
The court stated that the role of state antitrust laws was to address condi-
tions beyond the reach of federal laws. 99 The court concluded that given the
substantial similarity in text and purpose of federal and state antitrust laws,
the federal decisions construing the Sherman and Clayton Acts, although
not necessarily controlling, were entitled to careful scrutiny in determining
the scope of the state antitrust statute."°
In justifying its adoption of federal precedent as a guide to interpreting
the Colorado Act, the court appears to rely solely on the doctrine of in pan
matert'a. Interestingly, the court ignored the Attorney General's argu-
ment, 1 ' which reached the same conclusion by means of the "borrowing
doctrine." Under this doctrine, the construction of statutes borrowed from
other jurisdictions is controlled by the lending jurisdiction's interpretation of
93. It is interesting to note that the defendant did not contest the application of federal
precedent in interpreting COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1973), which differs slightly from section
I of the Sherman Act.
94. 645 P.2d at 1299.
95. Id. at 1293 n.3.
96. Id. at 1296.
97. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 51.01 (4th ed. 1973). An
illustrative case is State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909):
The Minnesota anti-trust law is framed along the lines of the federal statute, although
it is more diffuse. It may fairly be assumed, however, that the general purpose of all
statutes of this kind is the same, and we may therefore properly look to the decisions
made under federal and state statutes of a similar character for the principle by which
to construe our own statute.
d. at 107 Minn. at 510, 121 N.W. at 399.
98. 645 P.2d at 1295.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1296.
101. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 9.
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its statute at the time of the borrowing.1 0 2 The advantage of employing this
doctrine is that it has solid support in Colorado case law.
0 3
The court did note that in enacting the Colorado antitrust statute in
1957, the legislature "borrowed" Wisconsin's antitrust statute as a model.'
0 4
The court cited an affidavit from the draftsman of the Colorado statute,
which stated that it was the legislator's intent that any cases interpreting
Wisconsin's statute could be used as precedent to interpret Colorado's stat-
ute.10 5 Significantly, at the time Colorado borrowed Wisconsin's antitrust
statute, Wisconsin interpreted it in harmony with federal precedent.'
0 6
Thus, by looking to Wisconsin case law, the North Avenue court could have
"borrowed" that state's policy of accepting federal constructions of the Sher-
man Act as a guide to interpreting its own statute. The court could have
supported this conclusion by citing its own line of decisions concerning the
borrowing doctrine. 1
07
Thus, the court could have solidly and artfully justified its application
of federal constructions to the Colorado Act. The court, however, declined
to take this approach in favor of the more direct comparison of the Colorado
statute to the federal antitrust laws.
5. The Language Differences in the Federal and State Exemption
The final issue that the court had to address was the defendants' argu-
ment concerning the organizational differences in the federal and state ex-
emption provisions.' 08 The defendant seized upon two differences, namely,
the bifurcation and the reverse order of the human labor sentence.
The court easily disposed of the bifurcation issue. The original enact-
ment of the labor exemption came in a single section entitled "organizations
exempt."' 0 9 In the 1973 version of the statutes, that section was editorially
divided into two parts by the statutory revisor, with the human labor sen-
tence appearing separately." 0 There were no intervening amendments au-
thorized by the legislature. The change was only cosmetic, with no apparent
explanation. Because editorial changes by the statute revisor cannot alter
the substantive meaning, I"' the court stated that it would attach no signifi-
cance to the revisor's bifurcation.'
12
The court never actually addressed the defendants' argument about the
102. Vandermee, 164 Colo. 1!7, 121, 433 P.2d 335, 337 (1967).
103. See, e.g., Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
104. 645 P.2d at 1294.
105. Id. at 1294 n.4.
106. See,e.g., Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N.W. 1058
(1914).
107. See Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).
108. 645 P.2d at 1298.
109. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 55-4-3 (1963).
110. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-103(2) (1973).
111. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 2-5-103(2) (1973 & Supp. 1982). See also CoLO. REV. STAT. § 2-3-
703 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
112. 645 P.2d at 1298. The human labor sentence once again appears as a part of a single
section. An editor's note attributes the change to the North Avenue case. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-4-103 (Supp. 1982).
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reverse order of the human labor sentence. After noting the history behind
the sentence, the court only stated that the sentence, in and of itself, does not
affect the rest of the exemption and "has no independent legal signifi-
cance." 1 13 A plain meaning analysis of the federal and state exemptions
would probably have been sufficient justification of the court's quick dismis-
sal of any significance to the reverse order.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NORTH A VENUE
The numerous federal interpretations have molded the labor exemption
into a mature and well-defined legal concept. The North Avenue holding,
which accords with the federal case law, therefore cannot be claimed as a
milestone in the development of antitrust law. Instead, North Avenue is best
viewed in a broad sense. This generic approach suggests several likely
ramifications of the case and permits a richer appreciation of the importance
of North Avenue to Colorado antitrust law.
A. A Death-Knell to Q-T Markets
The court's rejection of Q-T Markets will probably be viewed as a death-
knell to that anomalous case. The severe criticism received by Q-TMarkets,
together with the North Avenue decision, firmly establishes that Q-T Markets
was wrongly decided. The only technicality remaining in the Q-T Markets
saga is its inevitable overruling by a federal court.
The court's treatment of the Q-T Markets case, however, seems mildly
troubling. Although the Q-T Markets decision was heavily criticized,"I4 it
was the only judicial interpretation of Colorado's antitrust statute. As such,
the case merited a direct, frontal attack if it were to be disregarded. Instead,
the North Avenue court's rejection of Q-T Markets was relegated to mere foot-
note status." 5 The unfortunate, though by no means fatal, result was to
dilute an otherwise forceful ruling indicating that Colorado intends to inter-
pret its statute by carefully considering federal precedent.
B. The Use of Federal Precedent in State Antitrust Law
By ruling that federal precedent furnished a guide to the interpretation
of the antitrust act,' 1 6 the court has breathed new life into Colorado anti-
trust enforcement. This ruling adds stability and predictability to antitrust
law in Colorado because businesses, as well as other public and private liti-
gants, can now confidently rely on the wealth of federal antitrust precedent
to guide their activities and shape their strategies.
113. 645 P.2d at 1299.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. 645 P.2d at 1293 n.3.
116. The court stops short of holding federal precedent "controlling" on the Colorado inter-
pretation, thus preserving the court's room to maneuver in future cases. This loophole was
probably intended to avoid exactly the kind of dilemma that led to the Q-TMarkets aberration.
It has been speculated that the reason behind the Q-TMarkets ruling with respect to the Colo-
rado statute was the federal district court's disagreement with the course federal antitrust law
was taking. See Note, supra note 7, at 225.
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C. Some Final Thoughts on North Avenue
The analysis of North Avenue and the implications suggested above seem
to assume that there is a significant amount of antitrust activity in Colorado.
It has also been noted, however, that only two cases, Q-T Markets and North
Avenue, have construed Colorado's antitrust statute since its enactment over
twenty-five years ago. The pragmatic question, then, becomes: does the
North Avenue case really matter? The answer, unreservedly, is yes.
The student or practitioner of Colorado antitrust law should not be
deceived by the paucity of reported antitrust cases. Because antitrust litiga-
tion is expensive, there is a strong incentive for litigants to settle.'' 7 One
commentator claims that over eighty per cent of all antitrust cases reach
settlement through consent decrees.' 18 The popularity of settlements helps
explain why so few cases reach the Colorado appellate courts and are
reported.
The best evidence of the antitrust statute's present vitality in Colorado
is the amount of antitrust enforcement conducted by the office of the Attor-
ney General. The office did not have an antitrust section until 1975, 19
which may well account for the relative dormancy of antitrust law in Colo-
rado prior to that time. Since the antitrust section has been added, however,
antitrust activity in the state has increased dramatically.' 20 Most of this
antitrust enforcement activity has been initiated by the Attorney General.
North Avenue constitutes judicial approval of the Attorney General's activities
and should be the encouragement needed to stimulate an aggressive enforce-
ment policy in Colorado.
Private antitrust actions may also increase as a result of North Avenue.
The use of federal precedent adds one of the incentives needed for litigants
to choose a state forum, namely, predictability in the law. A serious deter-
rent, however, to choosing a state forum remains due to the mysterious ab-
sence from the Colorado statute of a treble damage penalty.' 2 1 The
Colorado Legislature should view North Avenue as an invitation to enact such
a remedy.
117. Note, supra note 7, at 218.
118. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 758 n.8 (1977). See also Burke &
Walters, supra note 6, at 2.
119. Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 1.
120. Burke & Walters, supra note 6, at 1. There are several reasons for this increase in state
antitrust enforcement in Colorado and across the nation. An exhaustive discussion of these
reasons, however, is both beyond the scope of this comment and has been well documented in
other writings. See generally Dibble & Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of1979. Getting into the State
Antitrust Business, 57 UTAH L. REV. 73 (1980); Rahl, State Antitrust Snposium, 4 J. CORP. L. 475
(1979); Sicker, The Role of States in Antitrust Law Enforcement--Some Views and Observatitns, 39 TEx.
L. REv. 873 (1961); Note, The Present Revival and Future Course ofState Antitrust Enforcement, 38
N.Y.U.L. REV. 575 (1963).
121. The absence of a treble damages penalty was explained in part by the affidavit of
David J. Clark, cited by the North Avenue court. "I did make certain changes regarding penalties
to be applied, such as elimination of the provision for treble damages in civil cases, because I
thought the new statute should be 'on the books' for awhile before private actions for treble
damages could be instituted. 645 P.2d at 1294, n.4. This does not explain, however, why the




Finally, state antitrust enforcement is important to Colorado because
some industries may be wholly intrastate and thus not within the federal
jurisdiction. In what is perhaps the major downfall of the North Avenue opin-
ion, the court made only a fleeting reference' to this issue when it stated that
the purpose of state antitrust law is protection of the public against restraints
of trade "beyond the reach of federal law." 12 2 The court leaves to the reader
the troubling task of deciding what constitutes an activity "beyond the reach
of federal law."
Presumably, the answer is those activities that are entirely intrastate.
The authorities, however, are in conflict on the viability of the inter-
state/intrastate distinction. Some argue that almost all actions will result in
interstate commerce. 123 Other writers maintain that industries do exist
which are completely intrastate, such as dry cleaning, dairy farming, and
restaurants.1 24 In light of the tremendous docket problems facing the fed-
eral courts today, it is not inconceivable that the federal courts will be less
inclined to find the degree of interstate activity required to invoke federal
jurisdiction. This increased burden on state courts would make state anti-
trust laws even more important.
CONCLUSION
North Avenue represents the Colorado Supreme Court's first construction
of the state's modern antitrust statute. The case clearly indicates that inter-
pretations of federal antitrust statutes will be given considerable weight
when construing Colorado's antitrust statute. The concepts delineated
above are compelling reasons for an aggressive state antitrust enforcement
policy, and they show that any reliance on the scarcity of reported antitrust
cases as an indication of the degree of antitrust activity in Colorado is a trap
for the unwary. As a result, North Avenue is not an example of much ado
about nothing, but rather, North Avenue should be viewed as an important
case which will significantly guide antitrust enforcement in Colorado.
North Avenue has put antitrust law in Colorado back on track. However,
North Avenue is but a single step. To continue the advances begun by North
Avenue, the judiciary must further define the parameters of the Colorado
antitrust statute, the Attorney General must maintain its aggressive enforce-
ment philosophy, and the legislature must provide litigants with an appro-
priate remedy.
Mark Li/'lie
122. 645 P.2d at 1295.
123. Ducker, supra note 1, at 560 n.7.
124. Note, supra note 7, at 232-33.
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